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THE FUTURE-ARTS* IH
FRANK M. MCDERMOTT * *
DAILY RECORD OF FACILITY OPERATION
TIME
(GMT) REMARKS
1640 Getting several erroneous altitude reports: two
air carriers, both descending to 7,000, showing
3,600. South departure leaving 5,000, showing
3,400.
1710 More erroneous altitudes: Corporate aircraft at
7,000 showing 14,900 about every third sweep.
Air carrier southbound departure, leaving 10,300,
showing 3,700.
1751 Corporate aircraft, four northwest of field at
3,000; altitude readout showing 6,900 for three
sweeps.
The above entries appeared in the Daily Log of a major control
tower recently. The record indicates seven instances of major de-
viation in aircraft altitude readout on the controller's display in
a little more than one hour. During that hour some 150 aircraft
passed in and out of the terminal area. The separation of these
aircraft depended to a great extent upon the accurate readout of
altitude data on the controllers' display.
The printout of the altitude on the controller's display is a vital
element in the terminal area system known as ARTS. The counter-
* Automated Radar Terminal Systems.
** J.D., American University; M.B.A., University of Chicago; President,
Frank McDermott, Ltd.; Former Technical Advisor to the Director of Research,
Federal Aviation Agency.
'Automated Radar Terminal Systems is the processing and displaying of air-
craft identification, flight plan data, altitude, speed, and other data for the terminal
controller.
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part of ARTS is the NAS STAGE A! computer system used in
Air Route Traffic Control (ARTC) Centers. The ARTC centers
provide enroute flight information concerning aircraft once they
have left the area surrounding the terminal serviced by the ARTS
system. Although there are many technical differences in the two
systems, they serve the same purpose. Thus, for purposes of this
paper the term "ARTS" may be considered as the generic term
for automation in air traffic control
History
About twenty-five years ago, a small group of experienced con-
trollers were assigned to the Technical Development Center' of
the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), and given the task
of developing a system capable of keeping track of and displaying
flight data pertaining to aircraft flying on instrument flight plans
in the air traffic control system. The principal tool in this re-
search was the Dynamic Simulator.' The simulator also was used
to develop radar procedures and train the nucleus of controllers
from towers and centers about to be equipped with radar.' The
simulator served the dual function of providing the procedures and
training for the then current system, as well as preparing the air
traffic control environment to cope with the commercial jet trans-
ports, soon to enter the system.
The equipment and procedures used for keeping track of aircraft
at the time were quite primitive. Flight data was written on flight
progress strips, and displayed in vertical racks. This data was
passed by interphone from one controller to another, and from one
traffic control facility to the next. Aircraft reported their position
by radio, often through remote relay stations. As the speed of air-
craft increased it was not uncommon for a flight to enter the con-
2 NAS STAGE A is the title of the computer system used in enroute centers.
3The symbology used in the controllers automated display can be found in
FAA, AIRMAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL, Part 1, Fig. 1-5 at p. 1-12 and Fig. 1-6
at p. 1-13 (1978).
4 The principal research center operated by the Civil Aeronautics Administra-
tion during the 1950's.
- The Dynamic Simulator is a system capable of simulating any air traffic
control environment. It is used chiefly in the development of radar procedures
and in the training of radar controllers.
6 Up until this time the only radar available was surplus World War II equip-
ment, and this was in limited supply.
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troller's airspace before the flight data had been posted in that par-
ticular sector. Even in those facilities using the World War I sur-
plus radar, however, the flight data lagged behind the airplane.
Controllers using radar were faced with the additional problem of
maintaining identity and altitude information on their radar
targets.
In 1956 the CAA assembled the first Air Traffic Controllers'
Conference on Automation. Controllers from towers and centers
throughout the country met to brainstorm the critical problems in
flight data handling, and to discuss how they might be alleviated
through automation. From this conference came a set of general
guidelines:
1. The radar target of the aircraft should be given some unique
identification.
2. The altitude of the aircraft, and changes in altitude, should
be displayed continuously to the controller.
3. The flight data should be automatically transferred between
ATC facilities and displayed at the appropriate control posi-
tions.
4. The estimated time of arrival over specified reporting points
along the airway should be calculated, displayed, and up-
dated as necessary.
Crude as these concepts were, they represented a beginning.
Although the CAA's research budget was severely limited, com-
puter specialists from IBM and UNIVAC' volunteered a great deal
of aid and encouragement in getting the automation program
underway. At one time there was also some suggestion that the
obsolete vacuum tube computers in use in the SAGE system might
become available for use by the CAA.
As a first step in providing aircraft identity and altitude asso-
ciated with the radar target, the research project at Indianapolis
used overhead projectors9 to display the basic radar data on a
7 The computer division of Remington Rand Corporation at the time.
8 Semi-Automated Ground Environment facilities of the Air Defense Com-
mand. Studies between 1958 and 1960 indicated that the cost of converting this
computer operation to civilian use would be prohibitive.
9 The horizontal display permitted a team of controllers to use a common dis-
play, with a great improvement in the coordination process.
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horizontal screen. "Shrimp boats'. were positioned alongside the
radar target, and were moved manually as the target progressed
across the display. The aircraft identity and altitude were written
in grease pencil on the target marker. Later, more elaborate mark-
ers had digital counters to display current altitude. Of all the
promises of automation, it was the altitude feature that held the
greatest promise. Display of current altitude to the controller could
reduce the hazard of midair collision, and virtually eliminate the
incidence of aircraft flying into the terrain because of navigation
or altimeter problems.
It was a midair collision over the Grand Canyon in 1956,"
followed by a 1958 military/civil mid-air collision in Nevada,"
that provided the major impetus for accelerating the effort to auto-
mate the ATC facilities. In addition, by 1957, Congress was aware
that growth in aviation was being stifled. The CAA, buried in the
basement of the Department of Commerce, had not effectively
voiced the need for an effective air traffic control system." In order
to encourage modernization of ATC facilities, Congress enacted
the Airways Modernization Act of 1957." This legislation created
the Airways Modernization Board (AMB)" as an interim agency,
to concentrate on the research and development needed to mod-
ernize the system. The AMB was designed to be phased into the
new, independent, Federal Aviation Agency, created by the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958."0
By 1959 a sympathetic Congress, an independent FAA with a
vastly increased budget, and the effective leadership of Elwood
10 Plastic markers with a pointed bow resembling a ship.
11 TWA/United collision over Grand Canyon, Arizona, June 30, 1956.
"DC-7/F-100 collision, Las Vegas, Nevada, April 21, 1958.
"This condition was reported by Edward P. Curtis, Special Assistant for Avi-
ation Facilities Planning, in his report to President Eisenhower in 1956.
14 Airways Modernization Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-133, 71 Stat. 349
(1958). The purpose of the Act was to establish the Airways Modernization
Board (AMB) and to provide for the development and modernization of the
national system of navigation and traffic control facilities to serve present and
future needs of civil and military aviation. Id.
5 A three-member board, appointed by the President, and drawing its staff
from specialists in civil and military air traffic control, navigation, and related
fields.
"6Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. S
1301 et seq. (1976), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat.
973.
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R. Quesada,'" had fostered an encouraging environment for the
field of aviation. Aviation problems were being identified, and
practical steps were being taken toward their solution. This en-
vironment made it possible to utilize computers to process all radar
targets, transponder as well as primary.'8 The radar targets would
be discretely identified, and accompanied with current altitude
and other pertinent flight statistics. Flight data would be automatic-
ally processed and displayed throughout the entire route, from
takeoff to touchdown. The computer could be utilized to search
ahead for conflict, both in route and altitude, and thereby provide
the controller with optimum solutions in ample time. Inbound
traffic to the terminal area would be metered and spaced by the
computer, providing maximum utilization of runways with mini-
mum delays. Significant data would be automatically displayed to
the pilot providing a more efficient means for pilot/controller
resolution of air traffic control problems'."
The FAA's independence was short lived. In 1966, the Federal
Aviation Agency became the Federal Aviation Administration,2'
and was incorporated into the newest addition to the cabinet, the
Department of Transportation (DOT). While it would not be
fair to compare the FAA's subjugated role in the DOT today with
the plight of the CAA as part of the Department of Commerce in
1957, there are some interesting similarities. Many of the argu-
ments for independence which were advanced then are valid to-
day,21 particularly in the area of the allocation of resources and
technology for improvement of air safety.
" "Pete" Quesada had served as Special Assistant to the President for Avia-
tion Matters, and as the Chairman of the Airways Modernization Board, prior
to being appointed first Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency.
" The term "transponder" refers to aircraft equiped with a transponder that
is capable of transmitting selective pulses conveying identity and altitude. The
term "primary" refers to aircraft which do not possess the transponder and are
therefore unable to convey data to the controller concerning its identity and alti-
tude. In the case of the "primary target" the controller is required to "capture"
the primary target through special input devices, inserting appropriate identity
and altitude information into the computer.
"1 The importance of a data link from the ground computer to a cockpit dis-
play was recognized and planned for by the Airways Modernization Board
(AMB) in 1958. FAA REPORT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND
PROGRESS 92-93 (1959).
2'Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 11, 80 Stat. 949
(1966).
" See Study of Operation of Civil Aeronautics Administration, Hearings on
1978]
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Present System of Automation
It would not be possible in this short space to describe all the
intricacies of the present ATC automation system. A brief descrip-
tion is in order, however, to permit a better understanding of how
automatically derived data can be used to improve aviation safety.
The system of automation in ARTC CentersP is called NAS
STAGE A. 3 It consists of a computer which is fed radar data
from several remote long-range radar antennas, and which in turn
feeds the displays of the controllers. Although maximum ultiliza-
tion of the system occurs with aircraft equipped with altitude
coded transponders," the computer also can process targets from
primary radar returns.' Aircraft identity, altitude, calculated
ground speed, and other data are automatically displayed to the
controller. The controller also has a terminal' which enables direct
communication with the computer. The computer sorts out the
data from all the various radar inputs, and composes a mosaic '
display of the airspace for which the ARTC is responsible. Each
controller's display is capable of calling out that portion of the
airspace for which he is responsible, and excluding the rest. The
computer also can be programed to feed information as to a strati-
fied area of operation, displaying for the controller only that traffic
between specified upper and lower limits of altitude. Where two or
more remote radar antennas in areas of overlapping coverage cap-
ture the same target, the computer determines which of the sources
should be used. Under such circumstances the controller does not
know, nor does he need to know, which antenna is providing the
data for his display.
The automation program in the terminal area is known as
ARTS. 8 Because the terminal area is confined to a region which
S. 2818 before the Aviation Subcomm. of the Senate Commerce Comm., 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
22 Air Traffic Control Centers, providing air traffic control service to IFR
aircraft during the en route phase of flight.
21 See note 2 supra.
24See note 18 supra.
See note 18 supra.
28 Changes in altitude, route, etc., can be directed to the computer from each
controller position.
27 The display is an X,Y grid covering the entire ARTC center area.
2 See note 1 supra.
THE FUTURE-ARTS III
is covered adequately by one central radar antenna, the composi-
tion of the terminal controller's display more nearly resembles the
conventional radar display in terms of orientation around a central
point of origin. However, the display can be off-centered, enabling
a terminal controller to work within a small portion of the overall
coverage of the terminal radar antenna.
These two computer systems are compatible, and their programs
provide for automatic handoff" of targets to other facilities and
displays. For example, in a typical flight through the ATC system
a transponder equipped aircraft at the time of takeoff is told by
the tower to "squawk"' a four-digit transponder code. The de-
parture radar controller's display then presents a data block 1
alongside the radar target as it emerges from the end of the run-
way, showing the aircraft identity, and its altitude in 100 foot
increments. Once tracked to the boundary of the terminal's juris-
diction, the aircraft is handed off from the ARTS computer to the
NAS STAGE A computer in the ARTC Center. There it is dis-
played through the various sectors, handed off to adjacent centers,
and then eventually handed off to the terminal ARTS computer
at its destination.
Weather Data in the Computer System
Primary radar, based entirely upon the capacity of the radar
antenna to capture reflected signals, in addition to aircraft, also dis-
plays clouds containing sufficient moisture to cause the radar
energy to be reflected. The display from heavily laden clouds can
be bothersome to a radar controller because such weather clutter
will obscure radar targets of aircraft. The terminal controller with
an ARTS display can eliminate the weather clutter by turning off
the primary radar. This, however, produces two problems. Without
the primary radar information the controller loses the ability to
see non-transponder equipped aircraft. The controller is also un-
29 Symbology on the controllers display permits transfer of control jurisdiction
from one controller to another without any oral communication.
" The transponder originated as a World War II secure reporting device. Af-
fectionately known as a "parrot," it was inevitable that the transponder would be
asked to "squawk."
" An arrangement of alpha-numeric data including aircraft identity, altitude,
ground speed, and other symbols, written on the controller's display adjacent to
the target and moving with the target.
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able to offer weather advisories concerning areas of heavy precipi-
tation. The radar does not show turbulence, but controllers gen-
erally are trained to recognize that turbulence is frequently asso-
ciated with areas of heavy precipitation as shown on the radar.
NAS STAGE A computers have been programmed with a
subsystem which allows precipitation returns to be converted into
symbols on the synthetic display used by the controller. Areas of
precipitation of varying intensity are displayed either as radial
lines on the scope, or by a series of symbols in the form of the
letter "H."3' The latter signifies the heavier precipitation, generally
representing a rainfall equivalent of approximately .5 inches per
hour. If the remote radar antenna has a microwave or broadband
link with the ARTC center, the controller can call up the primary
radar information on his display and observe the actual precipita-
tion areas. Without broadband capability the controller must rely
upon the digitizing process of the radar information at the antenna
site and the symbolic presentation of the weather contours as
computed in the data processer.
Additional Features of ARTS and NAS STAGE A
If the computer has sufficient capacity and speed there is vir-
tually no limit as to the functions it may perform. Recently the
FAA has programmed some interesting software routines into the
ARTS and NAS STAGE A computers. These include a Minimum
Safe Altitude Warning ' wherein the computer examines a stored
grid containing the minimum safe altitude for each two-mile
square in the terminal area. Should an extrapolation of the flight
path and altitude of an aircraft indicate an unsafe condition, the
computer will cause both an aural and visual alarm to be com-
municated to the controller. A Terminal Conflict Alert' provides
a similar analysis and warning with respect to conflict between
two aircraft in the terminal area. A similar software routine is in
"See note 3 supra.
3 Radar data at ARTC remote antennas is converted to digital form and
transmitted to the NAS STAGE A computer via telephone lines. This is a great
saving in cost over microwave transmission.
'FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ADVISORY CIRCULAR AC 90-72A (Jan-
uary 1, 1978).
s FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ADVISORY CIRCULAR AC 90-77 (Sep-
tember 1, 1977).
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use in the enroute computers, known as the NAS STAGE A Con-
flict Alert Function.
Use of ARTS Data in Accident Reconstruction
There has been a great deal of discussion about the use of data
stored in the ARTS and NAS STAGE A computer systems. The
FAA has taken the position that the processed data stored on
magnetic tape should be used only as a diagnostic tool in checking
the reliability of the system. Whether diagnostic or reconstructive,
the stored data has been used extensively by the FAA to analyze
the handling of accident and near accident situations.
The data stored on magnetic tapes enables a complete recon-
struction of the handling of an individual aircraft, several select
aircraft, or all aircraft in the system. The data from the ARTS and
NAS STAGE A tapes can be presented in tabular form by use of
high speed printers. In such instances the printout provides two
lines of digital data for each aircraft from each sweep of the radar.
Typically this data will include:
1. Time in hours, minutes, seconds and thousandths of seconds;
2. Aircraft identity;
3. Transponder code assigned;
4. Transponder code reported;
5. Altitude reported by transponder;
6. Rho Theta information based upon the location of the radar
antenna;
7. X, Y coordinates, based upon a grid centered on the radar
antenna;
8. X, Y coordinates, based upon an origin expressed in latitude
and longitude (NAS STAGE A mosaic display); and
9. Computed ground speed.
In addition, the printout will contain technical data pertaining to
the reliability and degree of confidence attributed to the report.
The magnetic tape data also records computer response in
effectuating handoffs from one facility or sector to another. Also
recorded on the tape are the computer input reflecting changes
in altitude, route of flight, and other data. All NAS STAGE A
computers have this magnetic tape storage and retrieval capa-
bility. Most of the ARTS installations also are equipped with the
modular unit permitting tape storage.
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JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The FAA procedures for record retention require that these
computer tapes be held for fifteen days.' The instructions issued
to center and tower chiefs concerning the retention of computer
tapes in the event of an accident are somewhat ambiguous. Whereas
voice recorder tapes involved in an accident are required to be
saved, there is no corresponding rule governing the ARTS and
NAS STAGE A computer tapes." Indeed, the FAA's current acci-
dent investigation manual,"s completely rewritten and issued in
1976, is silent on the subject of computer tape retention and use.
With respect to the ARTS computer tapes, the Facility Manage-
ment Manual,' at paragraph 1546(f) reads: "Tapes and console
typewriter printouts pertaining to accidents shall be retained at the
facility until released by AAT-20. DO NOT make these tapes and
printouts part of the accident package."' Since the National Trans-
portation Safety Board usually limits its inquiry of air traffic control
data to that material assembled by the FAA in its Accident Pack-
age, failure to include the computer data effectively denies the
NTSB a most valuable source of reconstruction material.
The reconstruction of flight paths based upon the computer
printout of stored data is a laborious, but effective, process. The
physical process requires the creation of an X, Y grid on a plastic
overlay with incremental units of one nautical mile. The scale
selected should be that of the appropriate underlying aeronautical
or topographic chart. The X, Y mileage values are given in thous-
andths of a mile, with each decimal unit equivalent to approxi-
mately six feet. Since the manner of presenting the stored data
is merely a function of programming the extraction routine, the
FAA has developed a variety of methods of reconstructing and
displaying the flight information.
The same highspeed printer which is used to print the tabular
data also can serve as the output device for a reconstructed grid,
showing aircraft position information, navigational fixes, airports,
31 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, RECORDS ORGANIZATION, TRANSFER AND
DESTRUCTION STANDARDS 88 (1971).
31U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, FACILITY MANAGEMENT 42-48 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as FACILITY MANAGEMENT].
38 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT NOTI-
FICATION, INVESTIGATION, AND REPORTING (1976).
39 FACILITY MANAGEMENT, supra note 37, at 163.
40 Id.
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and other data in a plain view. The product of this printout is
crude and lacks topographic data necessary for a complete analysis,
but it does serve as a useful tool in determining the proper portions
of the flight to be studied in detail. Finally, the tape containing the
stored data can be played through a computer to reconstruct the
flight situation on a controllers display-exactly as it appeared to
the controller in its original state. This capability is a closely
guarded secret within the FAA, yet is used extensively by the
FAA in analyzing accident situations.
Although there always will be a question of proof as to whether
the data processed by the computer actually was displayed to a
particular controller, the absence of any indication of equipment
failure or misalignment should weigh heavily in favor of the as-
sumption that the data was actually available to the controller.
For example, when Eastern Flight 401' was ordered to hold over
the Everglades at an altitude of 2,000 feet, and was observed by the
controller at an altitude of 900 feet, the controller did not give a
warning. The controller later testified that his attention had been
diverted to other traffic, and he did not observe any further alti-
tude reports on the ARTS display. The computer storage showed
that the altitude reports continued (and presumably were dis-
played) in descending 100 foot increments down to 300 feet,
prior to the aircraft disappearing from the radar display. This
computer tape was reviewed by a select group of FAA personnel,
but was never shown to the NTSB.
That accident, along with the crash of a TWA 727 on approach
to Dulles&' and the collision of a King Air with a radio tower at
American University in Washington, D.C.,'3 provided the impetus
for FAA's Minimum Safe Altitude Warning program. In each of
these three accidents the unsafe altitude was displayed to the con-
troller, the controller saw the altitude, but no warning was given.
It remains to be seen if the addition of an aural alarm to the con-
trollers display will provide a better response.
41 Accident Report, NTSB-AAR-73-14, Eastern Airlines at Miami, Florida,
December 29, 1972.
1Accident Report, NTSB-AAR-75-16, Trans World Airlines at Berryville,
Virginia, December 1, 1974.
Accident Report, NTSB-AAR-76-4, Wolfe Industries, Inc., at Washington,
D.C., January 25, 1975.
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Conclusion
Perhaps there has been an overemphasis placed on software
routines in providing additional alerts and alarms for the con-
troller. Despite all of the sophistication of ground equipment,
the pilot is denied access to the computer unless the controller
passes the proper information along by radio. The FAA has made
it clear that there are many limitations in terms of workload,
equipment and even discretion, that might prevent, or at least
delay the controller in passing important information to the pilot.
The capability to communicate data directly to the pilot from the
computer exists. Critical alert information could thus be displayed
in the cockpit of the aircraft where it can be evaluated and acted
upon by the pilot. This does not suggest that the controller's role
might be eliminated or even diminished. However, there have
been too many instances of disasters that occurred because essential
data was not forwarded to the pilot by the controller. Post acci-
dent arguments as to whether the controller had a duty to warn
can be avoided by automatically communicating important infor-
mation to the pilot by use of computers.
There can be no question as to the value of the ARTS and NAS
STAGE A computer data in reconstructing aviation accidents.
The ARTS data provides a precise position for each aircraft in
the system every four seconds. This data includes aircraft identity,
altitude, ground speed, and an account of whatever computer in-
put was made by the controller. The NAS STAGE A computer
data permits extraction of similar data at a repetition rate of six
times per minute. In addition, the NAS computer will provide
information as to weather conditions displayed to the controller.
The voice recorder tapes in both centers and towers permit
transcribing all conversations, radio and interphone, and correlating
specific transmissions to precise positions of aircraft as determined
from the computer readout. The data from aircraft derived from
cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders also can be cor-
related with the data from the ARTS and NAS computers, and
from the voice tapes in centers and towers.
All of this data should be readily available to responsible avia-
tion accident investigators. The end product would be a more ac-
curate determination of the cause of aviation mishaps, and more
importantly, future accidents could be prevented.
